Is it “moving the goalposts”? The necessity of nociception thing (again!)
Another post about the necessity of nociception thing? 😱 Nooooo! But the whole reason I’m returning to this topic is that I do think it matters, and it is not just a word game.
In December I wrote that “pain needs nociception,” warning signals flowing from body to brain — which is a technical way of saying that pain can’t be psychosomatic. I reported on three papers that make that case in three different ways, but one of them was clearly the main dish, and the spiciest: a predictably controversial paper by Drs. Weisman, Quintner, and Cohen. Ever since then, I’ve seen a parade of complaints about that paper “moving the goalposts” or dismissing its argument as semantic gymnastics. For instance, Todd Hargrove has just articulated that position for his readers, and he’s good at it:
“A semantic argument is not about facts, but about the meaning of words. Both parties agree on what’s real, but disagree on how to describe the reality. For example, in the 2000s there was a debate about whether Pluto was a ‘planet.’ It wasn’t focused on contested facts about Pluto, but rather the pros and cons of different classification systems for celestial bodies. Ultimately, it was decided that Pluto would be called a ‘dwarf planet.’”
Great opening. I’m linking to his thoughtful post today … and taking the opportunity to have my say. Because I do not agree that this paper “is like arguing that Pluto is a planet because it would be a planet if we changed the definition of ‘planet.’” I do not think it’s just “another unfortunate semantic debate.”
Or, even if it is a semantic debate, I think it’s a good and useful one — because sometimes semantics matter.
The popular concern is that Weisman et al. “just” redefined nociception to include anything that precedes pain, “moving the goalposts” so that they can then say that pain requires nociception … as they define it. That is possible; it’s not an unreasonable concern.
But I don’t think their adjustment to the definition of nociception is so broad or empty as that. These semantic objections are at odds with key points made in the paper, which makes it clear that biological mediation is the gatekeeper: nociception, even when distributed or central, still must involve activation of identifiable neural-immune mechanisms within a “nociceptive apparatus.”
The existing definition of pain is obviously and infamously insufficient to account for chronic pain, sensitization, immune–neural interactions, and nociplastic phenomena, and Weisman et al. aren’t just cooking up a semantic adjustment to score a rhetorical point: their “new conceptualization of nociception” does actually follow from strong biological evidence that pain-relevant signalling is not confined to peripheral nociceptor transduction events. It’s not definitional trickery, but a legitimate proposal to adjust the definition of nociception in a substantive way that fits the evidence.
Attempts to describe nature with formal definitions are always limited.
“So that’s three definitions down, and none are ideal. What to do? Well, you do what biologists do and realise that actually there is no one-size fits all definition of species but rather you choose the one that suits your work the best.”
I think that’s basically what Weisman et al. are up to here, if we take a charitable view: they acknowledge the formal definition, and then they move on to hypothesize substantively about how the evidence suggests that there’s probably more to it. Despite the IASP definition, nociception in a broader sense probably is still involved in every kind of pain. If that broader sense is cromulent, then it’s not moving the goalposts … or perhaps we could say that it’s a meaningful and defensible goalpost upgrade.
Goalpost-moving isn’t always bad! Sometimes the goal is in the wrong place. That’s a messy reality of science. Weisman et al. could be wrong, but their argument seems like much more than a word game to me.